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In 2016, the book Animal (De)liberation: Should the Consumption of Animal Products Be Banned?
was published. This article aims to engage with the critique that this book has received and to
clarify and reinforce its importance for human health. It is argued that the ideas developed in the
book withstand critical scrutiny. As qualified moral veganism avoids the pitfalls of other moral
positions on human diets, public health policies must be altered accordingly, subject to adequate
political support for its associated vegan project.
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In 2016, Ubiquity Press published my book Animal (De)liberation: Should
the Consumption of Animal Products Be Banned?1 I am pleased and grate-
ful that some scholars have already published their critical reviews of
the book in various places, including the articles by Laestadius2 and
Paez3 in this journal issue. The aim of this article is to evaluate these
reviews and to clarify and expand on some ideas that were developed
in the book. In doing so, it will be emphasized that the ideas developed
in the book are pivotal to people's health and that, subject to sufficient
political support, they should inform public health policy.
Before embarking on this task, I would like to express that the meta‐
ethical position that is adopted throughout this article, aswell as inmywork
in general, is Pyrrhonianmoral scepticism,which is the position that, when-
ever a claim is made that X or Y ought (not) to be done (by anymoral agent
in a particular situation), it is inappropriate to assert that claim with cer-
tainty.4Whenever aPyrrhonianmoral sceptic claims that something is right
or wrong, they are neither adopting the view that what is right or wrong is
merely a matter of personal preference or taste (moral relativism) nor that
its universal validity would be beyond any doubt (moral dogmatism).2 | A BRIEF SUMMARY OF ANIMAL (DE)
LIBERATION
I would like to start by providing a very concise summary of the theory
developed in the book. I argue that to address the questions whether and
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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cal Practice Published by John Wilwhen the human consumption of animal products may be justifiable, one
must consider not only the human interest in using animals for nutritional
purposes but also a raft of other interests. These interests are:
1. An interest in avoiding the consumption of animals, including
those who die naturally or accidentally, which is based on a more
general animalist interest.
2. An interest in avoiding the consumption of animals who are closely
related to us, which is based on amore general evolutionist interest.
3. An interest in avoiding the consumption of animal products where
such consumption relies on the intentional infliction of pain, suf-
fering, and death upon animals.
4. An interest in avoiding the consumption of animal products where
such consumption relies on the intentional infliction of pain, suf-
fering, and death upon animals who are closely related to us.
5. An interest in avoiding the consumption of animal products where
such consumption relies on the intentional infliction of pain, suf-
fering, and death upon animals with relatively great capacities
for richness of experience.
6. An interest in avoiding the consumption of animal products where
such consumption relies on actions that pose relatively high risks
of inflicting accidental pain, suffering, and death upon animals.
7. An interest in avoiding the consumptionof animal productswhere such
consumption relies on actions that jeopardize the integrity of nature.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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1106 DECKERS8. An interest in holistic health.1(p159‐160)
In relation to 1 and 2, it must be clarified that animalism refers to
the belief that, all else being equal, we should attribute more moral sig-
nificance to animals than to other organisms simply because they are
more closely related to us biologically, whereas I defined our evolution-
ist interest, or “evolutionism,” as the belief that, all else being equal, we
should attribute increasingly more moral significance to animals the
more closely they are biologically related to us.1(p80) However, evolu-
tionism could also be defined more generally as the belief,
encompassing both speciesism and animalism, that we should, all else
being equal, attribute increasingly more moral significance to organisms
the more closely they are related to us. This wider definition of evolu-
tionism is preferable as a being's evolutionary distance to the human
species is relevant to adjudicate the moral significance of all organisms,
rather than that of animals only. Whereas I argued that evolutionary
proximity has some moral relevance, the interest in holistic health that
is referred to in item 8 is the overriding interest that moral agents
should act in accordance with whenever they make any moral decision.
It requires careful balancing of our interest in eating animal products, of
the 7 other interests that I bring to bear on the issue, as well as of any
other holistic health interests that are not included within these eight,
for example, our interest in a good climate. This duty to safeguard our
holistic health is also articulated in terms of a duty to minimize negative
Global Health Impacts (GHIs) or to maximize positive GHIs.
It is then argued that the consumption of animal products fails to
minimize negative GHIs in many situations, for example, by causing
disproportionate ecological and physical health risks (chapter 1). The
resulting theory is qualified moral veganism (chapter 2), the theory that
vegan diets ought to be the default diets for most of the human pop-
ulation. It is accompanied by a political project (chapter 3), the vegan
project, which strives for the implementation of qualified bans on the
consumption of animal products. In chapter 4, it is argued that the dif-
ferent views that others, including academic scholars and slaughter-
house workers, have expressed on the question addressed in the
book fail to convince, and the book's appendix considers whether
vegan diets might be nutritionally sound or better than other diets.
Whilst I argued that our evolutionist interest extends even to ani-
mals who have died, the book should have explained more clearly that I
believe that a nonhuman animal's relative moral significance should not
be determined only by the degree to which the animal in question is
related to the human species but also by whether or not the animal
is alive or dead and by the animal's relative experiential complexity.
All else being equal, I believe that we owe more to living animals and
to animals with relatively advanced capacities to enjoy complex expe-
riences. These other factors explain why we cannot rely only on our
evolutionist interest. On account of the latter factor, I put forward
the view that, for example, “killing a one‐day‐old chicken embryo
may be less troubling than killing an adult mussel.”1(p161)3 | ENGAGING WITH LAESTADIUS
In relation to interest 8, Laestadius is right to point out that my theory
derives from a critical reflection upon the moral importance ofself‐interest. As I argued, every moral agent must “prioritise their
greatest (morally relevant) interest.”1(p7) The reason self‐interest is at
the core of my theory relates to the fact that I adopt the view that
the way in which moral agents are aware of their own interests differs
fundamentally from their awareness of those of others. Each moral
agent only embodies their own interests. Consequently, the private
interests of others are necessarily interpreted through what I called
our “individualistic bias.”1(p67) Ethical theory must be mindful of this
basic fact: Moral agents can only give importance to the interests of
others by imagining, rather than by directly feeling, what these inter-
ests might be. This is why one can empathize with another being's hun-
ger, for example, but one can only feel one's own. A disinterested
moral evaluation of the interests of another is impossible as every per-
ception of another's interests is mediated through, and therefore
affected by the moral agent's own interests. This does not imply that
one's own hunger is necessarily more important than another's. What
it does imply, however, is that each moral agent has an insurmountable
individualistic epistemological bias. Moral decisions about what moral
agents should (not) do for moral patients are always based on the
moral agent's attributions of moral patients' interests and on their
interests in granting these some moral significance, rather than on
what these interests actually are. In other words, moral agents inevita-
bly make decisions by balancing their own interests.
Whereas this individualistic bias does not imply that the physical
health of the moral agent should necessarily override the health inter-
ests attributed to others, Laestadius anticipates that many scholars in
animal studies will take issue with my speciesism as “human interests
ultimately take precedent.”2 Unlike our individualistic bias, this bias
could be avoided as moral agents could decide to turn a blind eye to
species membership. However, my book argues that they should not
do so. It should be clear, however, that speciesism does not imply that
peripheral human interests should be allowed to override important
interests of nonhuman animals. It might, for example, be wrong to pri-
oritize one's interest in drinking milk from nonhuman animals over
one's interest in not doing so, where the latter may be based on one's
moral view that drinking the milk in question would violate some
important interests of nonhuman animals. Nevertheless, Laestadius is
right that not all scholars in animal ethics are enamoured by my
speciesist stance, an issue that I shall return to below.
I also believe that she is right in pointing out that the book could
have addressed more “why moral consideration of animals is critical
to the promotion of health, holistically defined.”2 Perhaps most contro-
versial in this regard is the claim that our evolutionist interest is asso-
ciated with some aversion towards consuming animals, which is why
we may have a morally significant interest in avoiding the consumption
of animals, even of those who die naturally or accidentally. In an
increasingly more homogenized world, diets that include a large pro-
portion of animal products have proliferated. Consequently, many peo-
ple have (developed) appetites for the consumption of animal
products. In this light, the claim that we are also predisposed to have
some aversion or disgust towards the consumption of animal products
and that we should avoid consuming them in many situations because
of it may seem odd. For people to give any moral weight to an interest
in avoiding the consumption of animals per se, however, they must
recognize some morally relevant aversion or disgust towards their
DECKERS 1107consumption. Whereas my moral theory does not depend on a socio-
logical survey, my belief in it is likely to grow if I know that others share
the underlying values. Conversely, it may decrease if it is found that
many do not share my values.
Research will therefore need to be done to explore whether my
aversion might be universally shared amongst moral agents, and
whether it extends to all products derived from nonhuman animals.
My hypothesis is that both questions can be answered affirmatively,
but that many people fail to strike an appropriate balance between
their appetite and their aversion. I can relate to this difficulty.
Whereas my own dietary choices would be much more challenging
if I would not have been able to benefit from the luxury of being able
to eat a very varied vegan diet without much difficulty and without
significant concerns over its moral adequacy, the sheer fact that some
dietary choices may be hard does not provide a good reason for a fail-
ure to adhere to dietary principles. Apart from the cases mentioned in
section 1.1 of the book, I provide further, more detailed cases else-
where, however, to illustrate that there are many situations where
our interest in enjoying a nutritionally balanced diet would be harmed
unjustifiably if we allow our aversion towards consuming animal prod-
ucts to prevail.5 These cases also aim to respond to Laestadius's sug-
gestion to provide more detail on what qualified bans may look like.
They illustrate that the question what counts as an ethical diet cannot
be addressed adequately without sensitivity to personal, social, and
ecological factors, which vary significantly between different
individuals.
Whereas significant controversy is likely to be generated over the
claimed existence and moral relevance of our aversion towards con-
suming animal products, the view that zoonoses, negative ecological
impacts, as well as practices that inflict pain, suffering, and death on
animals undermine our health may be less controversial. Recent
research has even found that the false notion that human beings some-
how transcend nature and mortality may be a significant factor that
causes people to support the killing of animals, and that support for
this practice may in turn reinforce some sense of invulnerability. This
is known as “terror management theory,” the view that people can
be terrorized by their mortality and seek to manage this terror by dom-
inating other animals and by rejecting their own animal nature.6 The
same study found that people are less likely to support the killing of
animals when their self‐esteem is boosted, underlining the crucial
importance of human health for animal ethics.
I also argued that our health is jeopardized if we undermine the
integrity of nature, and that this concern with nature's integrity pro-
vides an additional ground to question not only the consumption of
many conventional animal products but also the development of new
technologies in the farm animal sector, including the genetic engineer-
ing of animals and in vitro flesh. This unease about tampering with
nature has been documented by others,7 even if it may not be univer-
sally shared.8 Whereas this does not undermine its moral validity, to
facilitate moral improvement, more research will need to be done to
understand why it may not be universally recognized. In spite of this
concern with nature's integrity, the development of in vitro flesh and
of similar alternatives to conventional animal products may be desir-
able to reduce the negative GHIs associated with conventional animal
products.In general, considering one's self‐interest adequately means
embracing a duty to maximize positive GHIs. In relation to this duty,
Laestadius rightly makes the point that Governments may not be fair
in calculating GHIs, but nevertheless that “the framework could pro-
vide a useful alternative to dollar driven cost‐benefit analysis if it could
be operationalized further in future work.”2 I agree with Laestadius
here and have indeed argued in chapter three that a significant prob-
lem associated with establishing good estimates of GHIs stems from
what Hardin called the tragedy of the commons, which is partly related
to the lack of international policy instruments.9 With exception for
those goods and services that should not be priced, a GHI‐based moral
theory, however, need not necessarily be seen as an “alternative to
dollar driven cost‐benefit analysis,”2 provided that the costs and bene-
fits that feature in such an analysis reflect a comprehensive account of
all the GHIs associated with particular actions.
The lack of detail that I provided in relation to what a qualified ban
on the consumption of animal products might look like is related partly
to my remaining uncertainties in relation to weighing up the different
moral significance we should bestow upon different organisms, and
partly to the complex business of evaluating the GHIs, for example,
the ecological costs and benefits, of actual and potential diets. Chapter
one provides no more than a summary of this complexity. As more
people take the key question addressed by the book seriously, I hope
that further studies and value discussions will refine GHI calculations.
Laestadius also queries the necessity of including the book's
appendix, which considers the nutritional literature on vegan diets,
by pointing out that the American Dietetic Association has stated
already that “appropriately planned … vegan diets, are healthful.”10
However, I considered the appendix to be necessary to address
whether this conclusion should still stand in light of more recent nutri-
tional research as well as to engage with the many people who remain
unconvinced in spite of the position by the American Dietetic
Association.4 | ENGAGING WITH PAEZ
The most in‐depth challenge to some ideas developed in my book
comes from Paez, who is unhappy about the fact that I did not discuss
Whiteheadian panexperientialism in the context of its rival ontologies.
Whilst I have discussed panexperientialism and its alternatives at some
length elsewhere,11 I would like to sum up briefly why I believe that
Whitehead was drawn to this view. Reflecting on Kant's12 idea that
the “thing‐in‐itself” cannot be known, Whitehead13 realized that he
did actually know one thing in itself rather well: He knew himself as
a feeling (and sometimes also a thinking) being, where his whole body
was understood as the feeling unit. He realized, however, that reduc-
tionist materialism understood bodies as spatial entities that would
be utterly devoid of feelings. One problem for this ontology is how
to understand the apparent reality of feelings, which is resolved by
denying that they exist. Whitehead also realized that dualism rejects
this solution by arguing, like reductionist materialism, that there are
some things that are utterly devoid of feelings, typically including
non‐living things, but that there are other things that do feel, typically
including at least some living things. One problem for this ontology is
1108 DECKERShow things with feelings might have emerged from those that lack
them. Another issue is how our experience of ourselves as unified
beings might be reconciled with the view that we are composed of 2
fundamentally distinct things, flying in the face of the commonly held
belief that our minds both depend on and influence our bodies.
Faced with these problems, Whitehead decided to adopt a more
parsimonious ontology that nevertheless takes the reality of our
embodied experiences seriously. Whitehead started with his own
experience, thinking that his mind was nothing but the integration of
billions of units of feeling that were spread throughout his body and
that feed into it. He then started thinking about what other things
might be like, thinking not about how they were observed by him,
but about what it might be like to be another individual. This led him
to conclude that we should think of other things in themselves by anal-
ogy with the way in which we understand ourselves, as feeling entities.
David Griffin14 introduced the name panexperientialism to refer to this
ontology, which is the ontology that believes that all true individuals,
unlike aggregates of individuals, have experiences. As my version of
this ontology adopts the view that all experiences are also sentient, I
suggested using the name “pan‐sentientism.”1(p70) In spite of the phys-
iological, anatomical, and behavioural data that I discuss in section 2.6
with the aim to obtain some idea of what the experiences of others
might be, I admit that Kant was right: No individual is really able to
know what it might be like to be another individual.
Whereas I am very comfortable with pansentientism, I am less
comfortable with the task, which I nevertheless consider to be impor-
tant, of ranking different entities' experiences on a scale of qualitative
richness because of my individualistic bias.1(p67) It is this bias that
reigns supreme, which is why I disagree with Paez that adopting a
panexperientialist ontology creates “ulterior problems.”3 No moral the-
ory that is based on any other ontology has provided a satisfactory
answer to how a moral agent might separate their own feelings and
interests from the feelings and interests that they may attribute to
another entity. Any moral theory that assigns moral significance to
entities on the basis of their experiential capacities is therefore faced
with this problem. As pansentientism argues for a continuum of these
capacities, however, moral decision‐making is likely to be more trou-
blesome than it might be for those who accept sharp dichotomies.
Pansentientist qualified moral vegans may therefore be expected to
have greater doubts about their moral theory compared to qualified
moral vegans who adopt a dualistic ontology.
Whereas our individualistic bias is insurmountable, moral agents
can reject a speciesist bias. My book argues, however, that we should
not do so. A substantial point that must be clarified is that Paez
wrongly concludes that my view implies that “agents act wrongly when
they do not give greater weight to the interests of their species co‐
members.”3 With many who have objected to speciesism I affirm, how-
ever, that “like interests should be treated alike, regardless of which
species the individual with interests happens to belong to.”1(p80) If
what would be wrong with speciesism is the view that like interests
should be given unequal moral weight, then I am not a speciesist. How-
ever, I understand speciesism to be the belief that human moral agents
have a justified interest in giving special moral significance to members
of our species. I write “our species” as I did not claim—pace Paez—that
“extraterrestrial species” ought to prioritize their species,3 but thathuman beings ought to do so: Speciesism is used throughout the book
to refer to human speciesism. Other scholars in animal ethics have
ignored significant interests that moral agents must tend to when they
make moral decisions. This is what my theory aims to correct, and I
mentioned in the introduction that speciesism—thus conceived—is a
subclass of our evolutionist interest.
Paez, however, shares neither my commitment to evolutionism
nor what it would imply for human nutrition. In relation to the first
point, Paez argues that adopting evolutionism would also commit me
to racism, in spite of my argument against this.1(p82‐83) Whereas I
contended that human beings have a racist interest, I argued that this
interest ought to be overridden by our greater interest in equality,
which stems from the mutual recognition between people from differ-
ent races agreeing that an equal world is better than a racially
prejudiced world. With this, I do not argue that my antiracist interest
depends on particular people from other races not being prejudiced
against me. Indeed, it may be appropriate to treat them equally, in spite
of the fact that they may not do so. However, mutual recognition is
required in the sense that racism would not be a moral problem if
nobody from another race possessed the capacity to question racism.
This is why I argued that the fact that nonhuman animals, unlike people
from other races, cannot make such mutual agreements with us is mor-
ally relevant. Whilst human beings and nonhuman animals cannot
mutually recognize that an anti‐speciesist world might be better than
a speciesist world, at least some human beings from one race and at
least some from another race can recognize and agree mutually that
an equal world is better than a racist world. Because of this difference,
I am unpersuaded that racism is justified by my commitment to
evolutionism.
Paez acknowledges as much and claims that “the victim's capaci-
ties to understand existing discrimination, rebel against it and repay
in kind” are crucial in this part of my theory.3 This is not quite correct.
What I think does the moral work here is that the moral patient is rec-
ognized to belong to a biological group that is, in spite of their evolu-
tionary difference from the group to which I belong, sufficiently
rational to allow for a mutually binding contract based on equality.
When the moral patient lacks this capacity themselves, Paez claims
that the only thing in my theory that might save them from discrimina-
tion is their being cared for by rational others, which Paez considers
implausible. I understand why Paez comes to this conclusion, given
that I wrote that “equal moral significance” should be given to “mem-
bers of both races who may not possess moral agency, but are never-
theless held dearly by the imaginary parties.”1(p83) I would like to clarify
that the question whether or not they are “held dearly” is not morally
relevant. Whilst they should be “held dearly,” regardless of their capac-
ities, the crucial point that I would like to make is that merely their
membership of another race that includes members who are recog-
nized as being able to make a mutually binding contract based on
equality with members of my race is sufficient. It is not the moral
patient's capacities that do the moral work, but the fact that they are
a member of a biological group that includes members who are recog-
nized to be capable of making a mutually binding contract with us. This
should prevent their victimization.
In relation to what my commitment to evolutionism would imply
for human nutrition, Paez queries why we should hold on to the view
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dead bodies are no more than aggregates of molecules with experien-
tial capacities that can be deemed to be significantly inferior to those
of living bodies. This is an important challenge. I argued in the book
that an evolutionist interest is an interest in attributing special moral
significance to those who are more closely related, regardless of
whether they are either alive or dead. Whereas I remain convinced
that this interest ought to survive death, one shortcoming of the
book—as mentioned before—is that it did not make explicit my belief
that there is a difference between the moral significance of a dead
body and that of a living one. Accordingly, it may be preferable to con-
sume a dead animal than to kill an animal first to consume them, in
spite of the fact that the former may be more closely related to us.
To make this discussion more concrete, I provide an example. In a sit-
uation where either is necessary to prevent malnutrition, a person
would, in my view, be justified in eating a part of a whale who had died
naturally, rather than to kill fish, who are more distantly related. They
would, however, be wrong to eat a dead human being if the former
option was not available, in spite of the fact that eating a dead human
being would be preferable to killing a living one to consume them.
This also shows that evolutionism is not invoked to resolve any lin-
gering doubt about who is the most sentient being. In spite of my
doubts, I do believe quite strongly that a dead human being is insen-
tient and that the experiences of the remaining molecules are inferior
to those of a living animal. The challenge, however, remains: If we
assume that physical health risks could be minimized to an acceptable
level, why should we adopt the view that our evolutionist interest
ought to imply a prima facie duty to refrain from eating the dead bod-
ies of organisms who are closely related to us? Unless we adopt the
view that human beings have some natural aversion towards eating
the bodies of those who are closely related, I am unable to answer it.
However, I also recognize that, paradoxically, we have an interest in
eating animals and that sometimes our interest in “consuming an ani-
mal … ought to prevail,”1(p160) which is why Paez is not quite correct
to state that evolutionism demands that we regard animals as “unsuit-
able objects for consumption.”2 This is why I wrote that our “psycho-
logical health is best served by not conceiving of other animals as
sources of food where our physical health does not depend on doing
so.”1(p162)
Paez is right that the question whether the interests that I bring to
bear on the morality of consuming animal products are universally
shared cannot be derived from the small sample of people who were
interviewed and whose views I engaged with in chapter four, which
is why I wrote that “further research is needed to discuss qualified
moral veganism explicitly and with more diverse groups of
people.”1(p157) Paez is incorrect, however, that this implies that my
argument for a qualified ban is “methodologically problematic.”3
Whether many people agree with me may be relevant for its feasibility
(and—pace Paez—I did not claim that realizing the vegan project is fea-
sible, at least not in the short term), but it is not a necessary condition
for its validity. Its validity depends, rather, on the moral evaluation of
people's views. If the views of those who disagree with qualified moral
veganism do not stand up to critical scrutiny, there would be nothing
wrong with the vegan project or the ambition to create legal and polit-
ical changes in line with qualified moral veganism. This does not takeaway that I remain doubtful about its validity, which is why the fact
that Paez finds the ideas of the final chapter “extremely interesting”
provides a powerful incentive to organize more deliberative exchanges
on the theme in the future.3 As mentioned before, my confidence in
my moral position is likely to grow if I know that others share the
underlying values, but it may decrease if it is found that many do not
share them.5 | ENGAGING WITH TORRES
Another review of my book was written by Mikel Torres Aldave.15
Torres does a great job in providing a chapter by chapter summary of
the book, which he understands, by and large, very well. Nonetheless,
some ideas have been misunderstood. In addition, he has made a num-
ber of counterarguments to my theory that fail to convince me.
Torres writes that my position is that plants possess less devel-
oped experiential capacities compared to many animals (“muchos
animales”),15(p204) but I actually believe that this applies to all animals.
A more substantial point that must be clarified is that Torres is impre-
cise where he claims that I adopt the view that our dietary choices
should be guided by the general rule that we should inflict as little pain
and suffering as possible.15 This is actually merely one rule that must
be balanced with other rules. Amongst these is the rule to act in accor-
dance with our speciesist and animalist interests. It is at this point
where my position differs fromTorres's, who believes that speciesism
is irrelevant and who doubts whether animalism is relevant.
Curiously, Torres claims that speciesism is not relevant morally
because of the argument from species overlap, also known as the argu-
ment from marginal cases. This, however, does not make sense. The
argument from species overlap focuses on the moral relevance of par-
ticular properties that would exist across species to counter the moral
theory that different species deserve differential moral significance on
the basis of each species possessing unique properties. Speciesism,
however, does not need to be based on the view that species have
unique properties. My commitment to speciesism is merely based on
the view that the fact that individuals can be more or less closely
related to one another genealogically matters morally. This flaw in
Torres's understanding may have been fostered by his reading of
Garner's work, whomakes the same error where he claims that species-
ism implies “that because an anencephalic infant is a human being… she
has the same capacities as nonmarginal human beings.”16 Whereas
Garner questions rightly whether the concept of “marginal” might be
“offensive” when it is used in this context,16(p177) a debate that I shall
not pursue here, for the purpose of this article, I merely stress that
speciesism implies only that anencephalic human beings deserve more
moral significance compared to members of other species, rather than
that they have the same capacities as other human beings.
An anti‐speciesist position cannot explain why it is, in my view,
more problematic to eat a human being who died naturally than to
eat nonhuman organisms who might need to be killed to be turned into
food. An anti‐animalist position cannot explain either why, in my view,
vegans may not be immoral by refusing to eat animals who die natu-
rally or accidentally, in spite of the fact that their refusal may, all else
being equal, cause more pain, suffering, and death. Vegans who
1110 DECKERSoppose animalism also run into trouble in situations where they refuse
to eat animals who might either have been anaesthetized before being
killed or whose deaths were relatively painless compared to the
numerous animals who were carved up on the land after it had been
ploughed to provide their vegetables. This contrast is particularly stark
when we compare the killing of one large mammal, such as a cow, with
the thousands of deaths of the much smaller organisms that vegans are
responsible for by their refusal to eat a cow.
Regarding this last example, it might be countered that the balance
may tilt the other way if we factor into the equation the pain, suffering,
and deaths that cows cause by their walking and grazing. However, I
believe that there is a significant moral difference between our respon-
sibility for the pain, suffering, and deaths inflicted on the organisms
affected by our tillage and cultivation of the land and our responsibility
for the pain, suffering, and deaths that result from our decision to allow
a cow to graze. Allowing animals to live, even if this necessarily causes
others to be killed, is not the same as killing animals. This is why
ploughing the land poses a moral problem, whereas allowing a cow
to continue living does not. Whilst farmers may have duties to limit
the breeding of cows and to limit the negative impacts of grazing cows
upon others, I would argue that the negative impacts that the grazing
of a cow, per se, imposes upon others do not pose a moral problem.
This is why the pain, suffering, and deaths that cows cause by grazing
per se should not be entered into the moral equation when we make
dietary decisions. The anti‐animalist vegan, therefore, has a real prob-
lem: How can a diet be justified if it imposes more units of what they
consider to be morally relevant harm compared to another diet? Per-
haps they might counter that the life of one cow is worth much more
than the lives of the thousands of animals who are affected negatively
by the plough. Whereas I accept that some lives matter more than
others, I remain unconvinced, particularly if we consider that the thou-
sands of other lives that are lost through ploughing include other mam-
mals, for example, mice, rats, voles, and moles.
I would also question what anti‐animalist vegans might one day be
obliged to do if the human capacity to anaesthetize animals had
improved to such an extent that it would not impact negatively (due
to the administration of toxic substances) upon the healthiness of eat-
ing their flesh afterwards. Rather than to eat plants, there may then be
situations where they would be obliged to eat animals, at least if phys-
ical health risks could be minimized, if we remained ignorant of how we
might anaesthetize plants, and if the relatively greater disvalue associ-
ated with the loss of the animal's life could be assumed to be insuffi-
ciently great to tilt the balance the other way. It might, of course, be
countered that plants are insentient, which is the position that Torres
adopts, but this is contested by some panexperientialists. The implica-
tion is that, in some situations, panexperientialist vegans would only be
able to stick to a vegan diet if they adopted my moral theory.
It is also partly because of my commitment to animalism that
Torres is correct to say that my position regards the production of
in vitro flesh, in principle, as immoral. However, as animalism is no
more than one interest amongst many others, I also argued that its
production and consumption may be the lesser evil compared to
the production and consumption of conventional animal products.
Part of the problem with in vitro flesh is that it is derived from ani-
mals, thus clashing with our animalist interest, but the reason why Imight nevertheless welcome its large‐scale production—where my
cautious stance relates to current uncertainties about how exactly
this might be done, and therefore to uncertainties about its GHIs—
stems from my greater concerns with the consumption of conven-
tional animal products and my realization that there is great social
resistance to the adoption of vegan diets. For people who refrain
from adopting vegan diets for justifiable reasons, as well as for those
who cannot be compelled to adopt such diets in situations where
they nevertheless ought to do so, the consumption of in vitro flesh
may turn out to be preferable to the consumption of conventional
animal products.
In spite of my recognition of our social reality, Torres is right to
conclude that I favour the third political strategy, the vegan project,
which was defined as “the ambition to create international and national
laws to introduce ... a qualified ban” on the consumption of animal
products.1(p115) However, in spite of my contention that we should
focus on the vegan project, this focus is not meant to exclude the 2
other strategies that I outline in the book, notably education and the
adoption of better pricing mechanisms. In relation to the second strat-
egy, however, it must be emphasized that the existence of noncapital-
ist economies is not the only problem, but also my concern with the
ideology that all moral issues can be tackled by the adoption of appro-
priate pricing mechanisms. The book argues that many animal products
simply ought not to be consumed, regardless of the price that one
might ask for them.
This is another point where Torres differs, who argues that, as a
political liberalist, he values freedom a great deal. This is why he
cannot accept the third strategy. Rather, perhaps inspired by Rawls
—arguably the most famous defender of political liberalism—he claims
that the state ought to be reasonably neutral towards different con-
ceptions of the good.17 This is where his position runs into problems
as Torres also favours a prohibition on the cruellest forms of animal
abuse. How could this be enacted by a supposedly neutral state?
There is no view from nowhere, which is why even the state must
adopt particular values that are not necessarily shared by everyone.
I argue in chapter three that, since I am not a dictator and since I think
it would be wrong for me to impose my values on others, a qualified
ban on the consumption of animal products would only be legitimate
if it was supported by sufficient people who, acting within a just
political system, justifiably impose their values on those who
disagree.1(p115‐116) There may not be sufficient people to justify polit-
ical change at the present time. However, this does not imply that,
“morally” (“moralmente”), the vegan project would not be
defensible.15(p210) It is not inconsistent to adopt the view that every-
one ought to act in a particular way and the view that nobody ought
to be compelled by the state to do so as long as there is insufficient
support for the former view.
The political abolition of slavery presents a different example that
shows that it can be right to focus on the abolition of certain practices,
rather than on their improvement. Whereas the better treatment of
slaves may have been welcomed by early defenders of the abolition
of slavery, I believe that they were right to insist on abolition, in spite
of the fact that their views were not supported by the political major-
ity. It does not seem to be appropriate to defend liberty where that lib-
erty is being used to perpetuate acts that one considers to be immoral,
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Torres's defence of liberty appears to have been inspired by Rawls, it
is worth pointing out that, whilst Rawls included “freedom of thought”
within his defence of the liberty principle, he did not include the free-
dom to act in accordance with one's thoughts.17(p61)
Whereas Torres does not explicitly refer to Rawls to support his
stance, his position seems to have been influenced a great deal by
the work of Garner as he claims that this scholar would have “a more
appropriate theory for a liberal society” (“una teoría … más apropiada
para una sociedad liberal”).15(p210) The theory in question recognizes
that nonhuman animals “are due much more” than a right “not to have
suffering inflicted on them by humans,” but that nonhuman “animal
advocates ought to direct their attention” to the goal of “eradicating
the suffering of animals” as asking more than that would imply that
one expects people to be “saints.”16(p166‐168) While I am at one with
Garner that the suffering that we impose upon other animals poses a
moral issue, I also argued that it is inappropriate to seek to eradicate
it. More importantly, I argued that significant political change for the
better in relation to the consumption of animal products can only be
expected if people balance the whole gamut of interests that are at
stake in relation to the consumption of animal products appropriately,
rather than focus merely on our interest in the limitation of suffering.
Demanding that moral agents act in accordance with whichever inter-
est deserves moral priority does not imply that one demands people to
be saints. It merely demands that, in every situation, they tend to their
most significant duty or, to put it differently, to the interest that ought
to prevail. Whereas I agree with Garner that a “nonideal theory should
focus on the most urgent injustices,”16(p19) Torres's appeal to liberty
fails to undermine the case for political change to tackle less urgent
or minor injustices.
In the name of liberty, one could also defend that the state
should allow those who autonomously wish to ruin their health the
right to do so, at least where it does not harm others, which is the
position that Torres takes. I agree with him on this point, but—
contrary to what Torres claims15(p209)—it does not undermine the
central claim of the book: That moral agents have an unconditional
duty to maximize their health.1(p6) If one believes that this duty might
clash with other values, for example, the value of liberty, this may
seem problematic. However, if the concept of health ought to be
understood holistically, it includes one's psychological health, which
includes a concern with liberty. For moral agents, what is paramount
in safeguarding one's holistic health is to protect one's moral health.
Such health cannot be achieved if values that ought to be prioritized
are subordinated to other values. As Torres claims, many people might
argue that restricting one's liberty when making dietary choices
undermines their health. However, I argue at length that their con-
ception of health is problematic when their freedom to choose what
to eat is exercised in ways that override morally important factors
that ought to be prioritized. As Torres does not provide any examples
of situations where it might be argued that one's interest in liberty
ought to trump the other interests that I argue should be prioritized
in relation to various dietary scenarios, I conclude that my thesis
stands firm: Our duty to care for our health demands that we abstain
from the consumption of animal products in situations that most peo-
ple are confronted with at our present time.6 | ENGAGING WITH MANCILLA
I have also provided examples of situations where people should not
abstain, which is why Mancilla is incorrect to state, in her encyclopae-
dic article on “veganism,” that my position stipulates that “veganism is
the best dietary choice if we care about the environment, i.e. if we care
about the health of the planet as a whole.”18 Veganism should not be
recommended as the best choice for the many people who would, if
they committed to veganism, experience significant hardship, for
example, due to their experiencing great difficulties in finding or pur-
chasing the variety of plant‐based foods that must be consumed to
maintain good health. Whereas the health of some organisms might
be improved by the early deaths of people who, in spite of their inabil-
ity to live healthy lives on vegan foods, refuse to consume animal
foods, my theory does not demand such sacrifices to promote plane-
tary health. Additionally, and relatedly, it is also important to empha-
size that, whilst my global health concern relates to a concern with
the health of all biological individuals, I do not adopt the view that
“the planet as a whole” is an individual that could be either healthy
or unhealthy.
Mancilla refers to my position—somewhat inaccurately, but under-
standably in light of the general gist—as “an innovative defense of veg-
anism,” before discussing 3 counterarguments against “veganism.”18
She is right to suggest that veganism fails to minimize harm in some sit-
uations, but this first counterargument (the “minimize harm principle”
challenge) does not apply to qualified moral veganism as it demands
that we consume animal products in situations where not doing so
would produce more harm. Because of my commitment to animalism,
however, eating animal products may produce more harm compared
to not doing so even in situations where this is only so because of
the psychological harm associated with consuming animal products.
For this reason, those who adopt my theory of qualified moral vegan-
ism have, in sharp contrast to other dietary theories that ignore evolu-
tionism, one further reason why it may be appropriate to abstain from
consuming animal products in some situations. When they face the
“minimize harm principle” challenge, they have an additional defence.
Mancilla's second counterargument, which she encountered in the
work of Lestel,19 amongst others, is summarized as the view that we
should “turn meat‐eating into a ceremony” and “embrace the cruelty
embedded in life” as not doing so would mean that we “see ourselves
as superior to all other beings” and deny “our own animality.”18 This,
however, is a non sequitur. Adopting qualified moral veganism implies
neither that we affirm human superiority nor that we deny that we are
animals. The view that we should bestow more moral significance
upon human beings does not imply that human beings are superior.
As I do not believe it is possible to substantiate claims about absolute
superiority, claims about superiority and inferiority prompt the ques-
tion: Inferior or superior in relation to what? It is not inconsistent to
adopt both the view that human beings are inferior to many other ani-
mals, for example, horses, by virtue of the fact that we need to educate
ourselves much longer to flourish relatively independently, and the
view that we ought to value human lives more. It is not clear either
how a failure to embrace cruelty might imply a denial of one's animal-
ity. However, what separates qualified moral veganism from many
other theories that have been developed to promote veganism is the
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dietary regime, vegan or otherwise, inflicts a great deal of pain, suffer-
ing, and death.
The third counterargument identified by Mancilla is the (suppos-
edly feminist) critique that veganism should not be seen as the morally
correct choice, but as “one choice among many others depending on
individual and social circumstances.”18 Qualified moral veganism does
not fall prey to this critique either, however, as it does not identify veg-
anism as the morally correct choice for those for whom veganism
would be “nutritionally inadequate … culturally alien … or economically
prohibitive.”18
Whereas it is not entirely clear to what extent Mancilla embraces
these counterarguments, a significant shortcoming of her article is that
it does not mention that none undermine qualified moral veganism.7 | CONCLUSION
In this article, I provided a brief sketch of the key ideas developed in
my book, Animal (De)liberation, and explored several challenges that
have been raised against it. I argued that both qualified moral veganism
and the vegan project survive critical scrutiny. As vegan diets are piv-
otal to public health in many situations, I remain committed to the view
that they ought to be adopted by most of the human population at the
present time. Provided that the ideas developed in the book gather sig-
nificant political support, public health policy changes must be made
that prohibit the consumption of animal products in many situations.
I would like to thank my critics for engaging with my work and for pro-
viding me with the opportunity to clarify and expand on some ideas. It
is my hope that this work will inspire others to read and engage with
“Animal (De)liberation” and stimulate public health policy reform in
accordance with this moral theory.
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